Abstract The primate visual brain consists of many separate, functionally specialized processing systems, each consisting of several apparently hierarchical stages or nodes. The evidence reviewed here leads me to speculate (a) that the processing systems are autonomous with respect to one another, (b) that activity at each node reaches a perceptual end point at a different time, resulting in a perceptual asynchrony in vision, and (c) that, consequently, activity at each node generates a microconsciousness. Visual consciousness is therefore distributed in space and time, with the universal organizing principle of abstraction applied separately within each processing system. The consequence of spatially and temporally distributed microconsciousnesses is that their integration is a multistage, nonhierarchical process that may involve a neural "glue."
INTRODUCTION
This article is not a summary of past achievements but a speculative and conceptual gaze into the future through the achievements of the past. It is written with a philosophical ideology, namely that the visual brain is an epistemic system whose function is to acquire knowledge about the world, which it does not so much by "representing" the visual world as by constructing it according to its own laws as well as to laws inherent in the physical world (Mountcastle 1998 , Zeki 1993 . It is a modern, neurobiological version of a view expressed by Immanuel Kant (1787). A believer in the unity of knowledge, Kant sought to understand the formal contribution that the mind (in our case, the brain) makes, the organizing principle that it applies, as well as the limitations that it imposes in acquiring all knowledge. Explicit knowledge is of course intimately linked to consciousness, for it is difficult to acquire knowledge except in the conscious state. To question the unity of knowledge in terms of the underlying organizing principles, as I do here, becomes therefore a questioning, too, of the concept of the unity of consciousness. The term "unity of consciousness" is widely used and susceptible to more than one interpretation. I use it in the sense intended by Kant. He wrote that all perceptions 0147-006X/01/0301-0057$14.00 ZEKI "have a necessary reference to a possible empirical consciousness.... But all empirical consciousness has a necessary reference to a transcendental consciousness (a consciousness that precedes all particular experience), viz. the consciousness of myself," thus leading to " [t] he synthetic proposition that all the varied empirical consciousness must be combined in one single self-consciousness" (Kant 1787, original emphasis). The emphasis on "possible" amounts to an admission that there may be many empirical consciousnesses, but that any understanding depends ultimately on the one "transcendental" consciousness. The evidence reviewed here leads me to the view that there are many functionally specialized microconsciousnesses (perhaps equivalent to Kant's "empirical consciousnesses"), each one tied to a different knowledge-acquiring system of the visual brain; hence both the knowledge-acquiring system and the visual consciousness are distributed in space. Kant's conjecture that there is a synthetic, transcendental "one single self-consciouness" (myself ) into which all the "possible empirical consciousness" (microconsciousnesses) are synthesized raises the question of whether there is a seat of consciousness in the cortex, and hence a "unity of consciousness." I am of the view that this "one single self-consciousness," just like "awareness of being aware," is possible through the linguistic system alone and therefore do not consider it further here. Instead, using color and motion as examples, I explore the proposition that the knowledge-acquiring systems are fairly autonomous and that each has its own organizing principle and conscious correlate. I also consider what neural "glue" may be used to bring the results of activity in them together, to give us our coherent and conscious view of the visual world.
THE UNIFYING THEME IN VISION
The supposition that there is a universal organizing principle in acquiring all knowledge is plausible because there is, in fact, a unifying theme in the brain's quest for knowledge, including visual knowledge. This is to be found in the doctrine that Plato attributed to Heraclitus, and which is therefore known as the Heraclitan doctrine of flux. It refers to the fact that things are never the same from moment to moment, making it difficult to obtain knowledge of them. Translated into neurobiological terms, this becomes the problem of constancy: In vision, we speak of color constancy, of object constancy, of size constancy, and so on. The problem of flux led both Plato and Kant (with differences) to suppose that we can never obtain knowledge about what is around us through sensation but only through ideals (the Platonic Ideal and the Kantian Thing-in-Itself ), constructed by a thought process that alone, they believed, can give us real knowledge. I suggest that the "thought-process" is an unconscious neurological process applied in different areas to different incoming visual signals, the common aim of which is to make the brain independent of the particular by giving it knowledge of general properties. There are consequently many "thought processes," each one tailored for a different attribute and applied in a different area or group of areas, or even transient areas (see below). The argument rests on the demonstration that there are separate cortical areas that undertake separate tasks autonomously, and that activity in each can result in a separate conscious correlate.
Some Basic General Facts
Certain general and indisputable facts, which are nevertheless open to more than one interpretation, have led me to my view.
1. The visual cortex consists of many different areas, each one part of a chain or system that consists of several stations or nodes . A node refers not only to an area such as V5 (middle temporal-MT) but also to a specialized compartment of an area, such as the blobs of V1 or the thin stripes of V2 (Figure 1 ). There are therefore several parallel, distributed systems in the visual brain. The presence of several nodes within each processing system raises the question of whether activity at each is always implicit and not perceived until a "terminal" stage of processing, where perception is enshrined, is reached.
2. Apart from V1, all these areas reside within an expanse of cytoarchitectonically uniform cortex consisting of the basic six layers. This cytoarchitectonic uniformity naturally prompts speculation about whether, in addition to the specialized functions imputed to each, there is any common operation that all areas perform. The notion of a uniform operation, repetitively applied in all cortical areas, has been especially championed by Mountcastle (1998) .
3. There is compelling evidence that the different parallel systems, and the nodes comprising them, are specialized for different visual functions (Zeki 1978 , DeYoe & van Essen 1988 , Livingstone & Hubel 1988 , Zeki & Shipp 1988 ). The contrary view, which I do not agree with, states that there is no specialization within visual areas (Lennie et al 1990 , Leventhal et al 1995 , Gegenfurtner et al 1996 or in the visual brain at large (Schiller 1997) . I have traced this specialization to the brain's need to undertake different operations to acquire knowledge about different attributes and believe that it has found it more efficient to separate the different machineries for these operations into separate areas or systems (see below) (Zeki 1993) . The knowledge-acquiring system of the visual brain is therefore distributed throughout much of the cerebral cortex. Implicit in this view is the supposition that if there is a universal organizing principle in the acquisition of all knowledge, it must be superimposed upon microorganizing principles, tailored to the demands of acquiring knowledge about particular attributes.
4. Clinical evidence shows that damage to one processing system need not affect the other systems and, conversely, that a spared system can still function when much of the other systems are damaged or inactive. I Figure 1 A schematic representation of the motion (left) and the color (right) processing systems of the primate visual cortex. Each system consists of more than three nodes. In the motion system, the cells of layer 4B that project directly, or through the thick stripes of V2, to V5 constitute the first node; the thick stripes of V2 constitute the second node and V5 the third node. In the color systems, the wavelength-selective cells in the blobs of Vl that project directly, or through the thin stripes of V2, to V4 constitute the first node whereas the second and third nodes are constituted by the thin stripes of V2 and V4, respectively. Both systems have further cortical projections that would thus constitute further nodes, but these are not considered in this article.
interpret this to mean that the different systems have fair autonomy in their operations .
5. Recent psychophysical evidence shows that some attributes, e.g. color, are perceived before others, e.g. motion (Moutoussis & Zeki 1997a) . I interpret this to mean that different systems reach a perceptual end point at different times, and independently of each other, thus supporting further the notion of autonomy. 6. Each node, or area, of each processing system has multiple inputs and outputs, both cortical and subcortical. Thus, activity in each is of consequence to several others. That each cortical node has multiple outputs (a rule applicable to the cortex at large) implies that there is no terminal station in the cortex, at least in anatomical terms (Zeki 1993) . This leads me to consider the possibility that activity at each node has a conscious correlate, a possibility that would confer substantial perceptual advantages. If so, then the conclusion seems inescapable that activity at each node of one specialized system must be capable of being integrated with activity at another node of another specialized processing system, no matter where in the hierarchy each node may be. This, the basis of the theory of multistage integration, raises interesting questions about integration and binding in the cortex. Multistage integration is made potentially possible by a universal rule of cortical connectivity, with no known exceptions: An area A that projects to B also has return projections from B (Rockland & Pandya 1979 , Felleman & van Essen 1991 .
THE APPLICATION OF "MICROALGORITHMS" TO VISUAL SIGNALS
Because there is a unifying theme in the brain's quest for knowledge, any or all algorithms applied to the incoming visual must ultimately share a basic property, namely the capacity to discount all changes that are unnecessary for acquiring knowledge about the permanent, essential, and nonchanging properties of all that is around us. But it is more than likely that even if they share certain characteristics, different rather than the same algorithms are applied in different subsystems of the visual brain. Here, I go beyond and suggest that the algorithms applied in the visual brain consist of microalgorithms, which are applied at different nodes or areas of a system. The microalgorithms belonging to any one subsystem, for example that of color, are also distributed in space. If deprived of the relevant microalgorithm, the incoming visual signals cannot be rendered meaningful. Color vision provides a good example.
The Microalgorithms of Color and Motion
Although no one knows the detailed neural mechanisms that generate colors in the brain, it is likely that the algorithm applied to color signals is similar to the one postulated by Land (1974) and Land & McCann (1971) . This consists of two steps that may well reflect the application of two distinct microalgorithms cooperatively at two or more sites of the color pathways. (a) One is a lightness microalgorithm to determine the lightness record of a complex scene in different wavebands (Figure 2) . This stage, which, as conceptually formulated, consists also of several steps, is capable of "discounting" changes in lighting conditions. The lightness (relative brightness) of a surface that is part of a complex scene does not change with changes in the intensity of the light coming from any individual area because a change in the illuminant in which a scene is viewed will entail a change in the amount of light coming from every part, keeping unaltered the ratios between what one area and what the surrounds reflect. (b) The second is a comparator microalgorithm, which compares the lightness records of a complex scene generated by the three (or more) wavebands, leading to the construction of color. A change in the wavelength composition (by changing the illuminant) will mean an overall change in the wavelength composition of the light reflected from every point, again keeping the ratios the same. Thus, the stage that compares the lightnesses generated by the three or more wavebands (second microalgorithm) actually compares stable ratios at each waveband, where changes have already been discounted. Together, the two microalgorithms constitute the formal contribution of the brain to the acquisition of knowledge about color, the limitations being imposed by other factors, including the capacities of the photoreceptors for absorbing light of different wavelengths.
The visual motion subsystem is the other one most intensively studied. Of the algorithms proposed for it (see Ullman 1982) , that of Movshon et al (1985) is as neat as any. Here again, what I interpret to be two microalgorithms are involved, and like the color microalgorithms, they are distributed in space. The first one, based in V1, computes the local direction of small parts of a moving object, whereas the second, based in V5, extracts the overall direction of motion of the object. (There may be more than two microalgorithms, as in the color system, for no one has provided an adequate formulation of what happens to the motion or color signals within V2.) A further similarity with the color algorithm is that changes that are not essential for detecting the overall direction of motion must be discounted.
TIME AND SPACE IN ALGORITHMS
Kant believed there are two innate intuitions, time and space, which antedate all experience, but into which all experience is read. Space "must already lie at the basis in order for certain sensations to be referred to something outside me ... [and] ... as being in different locations" whereas "simultaneity or succession would not even enter our perception if the presentation of time did not underlie them a priori" (Kant 1787).
The color and motion processing systems share a common requirement, in that the motion or the color must be referred to a position outside the observer. But though space and time are important for calculations in both domains, there are substantial differences between the requirements of the two systems, making it not implausible to suppose that this is another reason for the physical separation of the two processing systems. With color vision, the brain has to determine simultaneously the amount of light of a given waveband composition reflected (a) from a surface located in one region of space and (b) from its surrounds (which can be arbitrarily arranged) located in a different region. With motion, the requirements are different. Now the direction, and therefore the relation of at least two spatial points, successively in time, becomes important.
The application of the microalgorithm to the incoming signals is a process we are not normally aware of. Leibnitz (1714) thought that we cannot be conscious of all the automatic (thought) processes that are necessary for us to perceive the reality behind all natural phenomenon, and that therefore there must be an unconscious mind. I translate the unconscious mind of Leibnitz to mean the microalgorithm, from which I conclude that a different unconscious process underlies each of the (micro)conscious events that we experience. The clinical evidence shows that each microalgorithm can give a certain limited knowledge about the visual world without necessarily involving other microalgorithms. In the color system for example, application of the first microalgorithm gives knowledge about the reflectance of surfaces at a given waveband (reflectance being the amount of light reflected from a surface as a percentage of the light incident on it), whereas the second constructs color and thus gives knowledge about the reflectance of surface for light of all wavebands, color being strictly an interpretation that the brain gives to the reflectance of a surface for light of different wavebands. The second microalgorithm is contingent upon the first, but the reverse is not the case. In the motion system, the second microalgorithm can, it seems, be applied even in the absence of the first.
THE CORTICAL SITES OF THE COLOR AND MOTION ALGORITHMS
In the color system, the first microalgorithm is applied at a prebinocular stage and may involve the entire visual pathway up to the monocular cells of V1, whereas the second microalgorithm is at a postbinocular stage (Moutoussis & Zeki 2000) , and probably in the V4 complex (Bartels & Zeki 2000) .
The Color Center in the Human Brain
The human color center is located in the fusiform gyrus and consists of two subdivisions, V4 and V4α (Bartels & Zeki 2000) (Figure 3 ), just as in monkeys (Zeki 1977 , Shipp & Zeki 1995 . In both, the two subdivisions together constitute the V4 complex and represent the entire contralateral hemifield, retino-topically in V4 (McKeefry & Zeki 1997 and nonretinotopically within V4α (Bartels & Zeki 2000) . The presence of two subdivisions, both apparently cooperatively active and involved in color, raises the question of whether there is more than one microalgorithm operating within the V4 complex itself. The V4 complex is a pivotal center in the color system and receives input from V1 and V2 , DeYoe & van Essen 1988 , Nakamura et al 1993 . It is not a terminal station; it sends outputs to the inferior temporal cortex (Desimone et al 1980) where, in monkeys, cells selective for color have been found (Komatsu et al 1992) [note that the posterior part at least of the area called temporo-occipital (TEO) is almost certainly a ventral extension of V4 (Zeki 1996) ]. In humans, imaging evidence also implicates the inferior temporal cortex in color when it is a property of objects (Zeki & Marini 1998) . The projection fields of the V4 complex are not considered further here.
A recent terminological confusion introduced by Hadjikhani et al (1998) makes it necessary to digress briefly. The human V4 complex is located ventrally in the fusiform gyrus. Hadjikhani et al (1998) have confirmed the presence of a retinotopically organized color-selective area here but have called it area "V8," thus causing unnecessary confusion and highlighting a problem with their area "V4v," also located in the fusiform gyrus but posterior to our V4. Apparently V4v represents upper fields alone, making it into one of Kaas' (1993) "improbable areas. described "V8," lying anterior to their "V4v," as a new, "previously undifferentiated cortical area," a conclusion accepted uncritically by Heywood & Cowey (1998) , who thought that it is damage to "area V8, not the favorite candidate V4" that produces cortical color blindness when damaged, making "V8" "a ready candidate for a region responsible for our conscious perception of a colored world." In fact, their "new" area (V3) has the identical Talairach coordinates as our previously defined V4 (see Hadjikhani et al 1998 ; see also Figure 4 ) and is therefore the same area, which they have tried to rename. Their reason for calling it "V8," ostensibly at any rate, is that it lies in front of putative area "V4v" defined earlier by Tootell et al (1996; see also Sereno et al 1995) . But the existence of "V4v" as an area separated from V4, in which the upper visual field alone is mapped, and in which there is no selectivity for color, as claimed by Hadjikhani et al (1998) , is in doubt. Others (DeYoe et al 1996) have found that the area called "V4v" corresponds at least partially to the color-selective region (V4) defined earlier by us (Lueck et al 1989 . Moreover, we (Bartels & Zeki 2000) and others (Kastner et al 1998) have not been able to Figure 4 The locations of the three areas that are discussed in the text, in a glass-brain projection. The areas were located by using the Talairach coordinates of the three areas given in the paper by Hadjikhani et al (1998) . O corresponds to area V4, as defined elsewhere (Lueck et al 1989 , McKeefry & Zeki 1997 ; X corresponds to the "new" area "V8" of Hadjikhani et al (1998) ; + corresponds to area V4v, as defined by Sereno et al (1995) . [From Bartels & Zeki (2000).] confirm the existence of an area "V4v" separate from V4. The reasons for this difficulty in confirming the result of Tootell et al have been discussed elsewhere (Bartels & Zeki 2000) and may be traceable, at least in part, to the way in which the phase-encoded retinal stimulation method of Engel et al (1994) has been used by these authors. In sum it is evident that "V8" is identical to V4, but it remains doubtful whether area "V4v" extsts.
The Motion Center of the Human Brain
The motion center of the human brain is centered around area V5 and is too well known to be described in detail here. Suffice it to say that V5 is also part of a chain that, like the color system, includes different compartments of V1 and V2 (see Figure 1 ). There are thus more than two cortical nodes involved up to the level of V5, and clinical evidence also suggests that the microalgorithms of motion are distributed between the nodes. V5 is surrounded by other areas that are functionally specialized for different kinds of motion and are anatomically linked to V5, thus constituting the V5 complex (Wurtz et al 1990 , Howard et al 1996 , Orban 1997 ). But clinical evidence shows that not all the parts of the V5 complex depend on the integrity of V5 itself, which suggests the relative autonomy of nodes.
CONSEQUENCES OF DAMAGE TO THE COLOR AND THE MOTION SYSTEMS
In general terms, the clinical evidence shows that damage to the V4 complex causes cerebral achromatopsia, or an incapacity to see the world in color (Meadows 1974 , Zeki 1990a , whereas damage to V5 causes akinetopsia, or an inability to see objects when they are in motion (Zihl et al 1983 Zeki 1991) . Lesions in the V4 complex do not cause akinetopsia or defects of depth or form vision, whereas those in V5 do not cause achromatopsia or defects in depth vision or form vision for stationary objects. The two processing systems are therefore, at this level, substantially autonomous, a conclusion that is reinforced by the clinical evidence for other kinds of specific deficit, produced by other specific lesions (for a review, see . But clinical evidence also shows that activity at individual nodes of a processing system can be perceptually explicit, that is they require no further processing, and have a conscious correlate. Moreover, when distal parts of a system are damaged, the activity in the remaining parts is all that becomes explicit.
In classical cases of achromatopsia, the ocular media, the retina, and the optic pathways up to V1 are intact (e.g. Mollon et al 1980) , as if the signals can only be rendered meaningful if a microalgorithm is applied to them (within the V4 complex). My examination of achromatopsic patients showed that they can experience lightnesses at any waveband consciously, though without being able to see colors (Zeki 1990a; S Zeki, unpublished results) . This implies that it is the second microalgorithm that is applied within the V4 complex, and that the microalgorithms applied to the incoming signals at each of these two nodes of the color pathway can result in a conscious percept. It is of course possible that in patients with V4 lesions, the lightnesses are generated in another system, as argued elsewhere (Zeki 1990a) . But because patients rendered achromatopsic by damage to the V4 complex can distinguish between light of different wavebands, though with elevated thresholds and without being able to assign colors to them (Vaina 1994) , we are still left with the conclusion that activity at an earlier node of the color system may be sufficient to elicit a conscious correlate, even if this activity is only implicit (that is, requires further processing) in people with normal vision. Moreover, some patients with (presumably subtotal) V4 complex lesions have a color vision that is wavelength dominated (Kennard et al 1995) , resulting in an incapacity to achieve the color constancy that is the hallmark of a normal brain. This may be the result of the activity of cells in V1 and perhaps V2, which are known to be wavelength but not color selective (Zeki 1983) . Normally, the activity of the wavelength-selective cells at this node is something we are not aware of, and it remains implicit until the next node, the V4 complex. But in brain-damaged patients, the responses at the earlier node can become perceptually explicit. This conclusion contains within it the germ of an idea that is worth entertaining: that cells whose activity is only implicit can, in the right circumstances, become explicit. Put more boldly, cells can have double duties, rendering the incoming signals explicit or not, depending on the activity at the next node, an idea explored more below. In fact, one may be led to an even more outrageous conclusion: that in the normal brain, what can become perceptually explicit and therefore conscious at an earlier node may actually be suppressed by activity at subsequent nodes.
That, in a compromised system, the activity at nodes that are left intact by the damage not only leads to a percept but is the only one to do so receives support from recent studies of patient PB , suffering from a syndrome first described by Wechsler (1933) , in which blindness resulting from carbon monoxide poisoning can spare color vision. I have tried to explain this by postulating that the richer vasculature of the blobs in V1 (Zheng et al 1991) protects them and the wavelength-selective cells in them from the effects of hypoxia (Zeki 1993) . The suggestion raises questions about whether activity in V1 can become perceptually explicit, which Crick & Koch (1995) have supposed is unlikely.
PB's vascular insufficiency was provoked by a cardiac arrest. After recovery he was found to be blind although he could see colors (Humphrey et al 1995) . His color-constancy mechanisms are impaired and his color vision is very much wavelength based. The activity in his brain when he viewed, on a TV monitor, colors that he could name accurately (red, green, blue-all generated with maximum phosphor purity) was restricted to the calcarine sulcus (area V1), which suggests that his restricted but conscious color vision is mediated through V1 ( Figure 5 ). Based on their work in macaques, Walsh et al (1993) had in fact suggested that mechanisms within V1 are capable of mediating perception of the basic color categories. Unfortunately, evidence derived from functional magnetic resonance Figure 5 Coregistered structural and functional magnetic resonance imaging data from patient PB showing, in coronal, sagittal, and transverse sections, the activation in the calcarine fissure (area Vl) when PB viewed colored stimuli. The white area shows the cluster of voxels exceeding an uncorrected significance level of <0.001. [From Zeki et al (1999)] imaging (fMRI) cannot exclude any residual activity in other areas that may have contributed to PB's conscious color vision but that was too weak to attain significance in the activity maps. The clinical evidence thus makes it plausible that we may become aware of activity in V1, without providing conclusive proof for it. What seems certain is that activity in V1 is not always a prerequisite for conscious visual experience, and that activity at visual nodes disconnected from it can have a conscious correlate. (Note that, for the sake of simplicity, I have written about the prebinocular stage, including the monocular level of V1, as if it constituted a single node. Except in the functional sense used here, that of generating lightnesses, this is of course not true because the prebinocular stage involves the cells of the retina and the lateral geniculate nucleus. It is possible to consider the entire prebinocular stage as cooperatively involved in generating lightnesses, which in any case probably involves at least three stages.)
The Riddoch Syndrome
In the motion system, unlike the color system, damage to the first (or earlier) part does not impair the second part completely. This shows that under certain pathological conditions, we can become aware of activity in visual cortical areas that are not fed by V1. In other words, activity in a visual area without antecedent, parallel, or subsequent activity in V1 can mediate conscious vision, even if this is extremely crude, which of course raises the question of whether "preprocessing" by V1 is always necessary.
If V5 is intact in a patient with a damaged V1, signals reaching it from subcortical centers without passing through V1 (see below) can still mediate a conscious awareness of fast motion (Barbur et al 1993 , Weiskrantz 1995 , Zeki & ffytche 1998 , thus showing that activity in a node fed with an appropriate visual input can have a conscious correlate. Long before such experiments were undertaken with modern techniques, the notion that conscious vision without V1 is possible should have become apparent from the studies of Riddoch (1917) . He had shown that some of his soldiers blinded by gunshot wounds that had damaged their V1 were nevertheless "conscious" of having seen motion (and only motion) in their blind fields. In the days before mathematical pitchforks and statistics invested scientific findings with a respectability they do not always deserve, language was used with greater care. Riddoch's use of the word "conscious" was deliberate-his subjects reported their sensations verbally. Riddoch nevertheless interpreted his results very conservatively, within the context of what was known at the time, and that did not include any knowledge about V5. Presumably, it seemed inconceivable to him that anyone should consciously see a visual attribute without the participation of V1. He supposed therefore that his patients were seeing motion in their blind fields because the gunshot wounds had spared those subdivisions of V1 that mediate motion. This conclusion was easy to dismiss and was quickly done so by Sir Gordon Holmes (1918) . He wrote emphatically: "Occipital lesions do not produce true dissociations of function with intact retinal sensibility."
The examination of patient GY who has a long-standing lesion in V1 has given interesting insights into what may be called the Riddoch Syndrome (Zeki & ffytche 1998) . Although described as a "blindsight" patient (Weiskrantz 1986 ) stimuli, which are relayed to V5 through V1 (ffytche et al 1995) . His descriptions of what he was conscious of when presented with such stimuli are compellingly similar to what Riddoch had described earlier, consisting of "shadows." Imaging studies show that the activity in his brain when he was viewing fast-moving stimuli was restricted to V5. These imaging experiments and previous clinical evidence thus show that activity in V5, without parallel or antecedent activity in V1, can have a conscious correlate. This probably reflects the anatomical and physiological picture that there is a direct input from the pulvinar to V5, and that directional selectivity, which is a hallmark of V5, is not abolished when macaque V5 is disconnected from V1 (Rodman et al 1989 , Girard et al 1992 . It is thus not true to say that "conscious vision is not possible without V1" (Stoerig & Cowey 1995 , Stoerig 1996 . The same picture could well turn out to be true of V4, which, in monkeys, also receives a direct input from the pulvinar (Cragg 1969 , Standage & Benevento 1983 . There is a report, not yet confirmed by other studies, of one blind patient who could report colors verbally and correctly, constituting a sort of residual vision for color (Blythe et al 1987) .
Similar experiments have not yet been undertaken for other systems, but the results from this system alone are compelling enough to raise the question of whether activity in one area or an isolated group of areas is not sufficient to elicit a microconscioussness for the relevant attribute. The reverse is also interesting, in that a patient with an intact V1 but a damaged V5, though unable to experience fast motion, can nevertheless discriminate and experience slow motion (Hess et al 1989 , Baker et al 1991 , Shipp et al 1994 , presumably because fast-and slowmotion signals take different routes to reach the cortex (see below).
The evidence from the color and motion systems thus suggests that nodes can act autonomously of one another, even if there are reverse, transverse, and forward connections between them. That activity at individual nodes within each system can have a conscious correlate provides further support for the proposition that the knowledge-acquiring system of the brain is distributed. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the microconsciousness generated by activity at a given node must necessarily be reported to a "center" for consciousness or a "Cartesian Theater" (see Dennett 1991) . Hemiachromatopsic patients, for example, are often unaware of their color loss (e.g. Paulson et al 1994; S Zeki, A Bartels, personal observations), which suggests that there is no putative consciousness center to record the gap in the patients' visual capacity.
The above evidence and discussion makes it plausible to suppose that there is no single organizing principle in acquiring all visual knowledge. Yet the idea of a universal principle, repetitively applied, is appealing. What could that grander principle be? I have suggested elsewhere (Zeki 1999 ) that it may lie in two linked factors that must be characteristic of any efficient knowledge-acquiring system. The first is abstraction and the second the formation of ideals. The former is a selective and eliminative process, allowing the brain to find some property or relation that is common to many particulars, and thus making itself independent of the particular to which it would otherwise be enslaved. This capacity is probably also imposed on the brain by the limitations of its memory system. As Descartes saw, memory could not be trusted in an unqualified way, even in the certain world of mathematics, where one has to rely on earlier steps in a deductive process. And there is no guarantee that the memory process itself may not be at fault, as it often is. The process of abstraction leads naturally to the formation of ideals, used in the Platonic sense of a universal in contrast to a particular. Again, I suppose that this is the product of an unconscious neurological process, a "thought process." An interesting example of a neurological "thought process" is provided by the experiments of Logothetis et al (1995) , who found a small proportion of cells in the inferior temporal cortex of monkeys that are able to respond in a view-invariant manner to nonsense objects that the monkeys had been previously exposed to. None of the cells, however, responded to views that the monkeys had not been exposed to. Thus the responses of this small proportion of cells is, in a sense, a synthesis of all the views, making a particular view irrelevant. This evidence comes tantalizingly close to suggesting that underlying the Platonic Ideal, which gives real knowledge about objects, is an unconscious "thought process" whose neural implementation is currently opaque, though it may become clear soon. Here, I put forward the suggestion that each of the many areas of the visual brain may be endowed with the capacity to abstract, though not necessarily on its own. On the other hand, abstraction in color is not possible without the V4 complex and is not dependent on V5, whereas abstraction in motion depends on V5 and is independent of V4. Hence abstraction, though it may well be a general organizing principle applied repetitively in cortical areas, is also likely to be tailored to the requirements of specific processing systems and the attributes they are specialized to abstract.
TEMPORAL HIERARCHIES IN CORTICAL ACTIVATION, PERCEPTUAL HIERARCHIES IN VISION, AND A CHRONOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
The application of an algorithm to the incoming signals must take a finite time, the processing time. By that I mean the time taken by a nervous structure to bring the activity within it to a perceptually explicit end point, which requires no further processing and of which the subject is conscious. In color vision, we may say that the processing time can be defined by the time it takes signals to reach the V4 complex and the time it takes for the subject to perceive a color. The issue is more complicated than that, however, if we accept that the overall algorithm is constituted by microalgorithms distributed in space and time. If activity at each node of, say, the color system is capable of becoming perceptually explicit, then we must think of microprocessing times underlying each perceptually explicit activity. Microprocessing time can be defined as the time taken by a node to render the activity within it perceptually explicit. We may postulate, for example, that there is (a) a finite microprocessing time required to bring the lightness calculations to a perceptually explicit stage, perhaps within V1, perhaps elsewhere, and (b) a finite microprocessing time to generate colors from lightness comparisons, probably within the V4 complex. This leads to the supposition that there are many separate, spatially and temporally distributed, unconscious processes (microprocesses) whose results, the microconsciousnesses, are also spatially and temporally distributed.
There is, in fact, direct psychophysical evidence to suggest that there is a temporal hierarchy in visual perception, from which we surmise that the (micro) processing times required to bring different attributes to a perceptual end point are different. The observed hierarchy could not have been predicted from either the anatomical arrangement or the physiological evidence. V5 receives the most strongly myelinated, and therefore fast-conducting, fibers (Cragg 1969 , Allman & Kaas 1971 ). The shortest latencies recorded have been from V5, not V1 (Raiguel et al 1989) , with signals from fast-moving stimuli reaching it in about 30 ms, compared with ∼70 ms, which signals related to color take to reach V4 (Buchner et al 1994) . It takes about 30 ms for the signals to reach V1 from V5 (ffytche et al 1995, Beckers & Zeki 1995) . This reverse V5-to-V1 temporal hierarchy can be contrasted with the V1-to-V5 hierarchy, related to signals from slowly moving (<2
• s −1 ) stimuli carried by the classical retino-geniculo-cortical pathway, with signals taking about 60 ms to travel from V1 to V5. In fact, the chronology is more complex than this. V5 has an ipsilateral input, in addition to a contralateral one (Tootell et al 1995 . The ipsilateral input is callosally mediated and takes about 11 ms to reach it from the contralateral side (ffytche et al 2000). The consequence is that both V5s are activated by fast-moving stimuli before the contralateral V1 is activated.
But it is color, not motion, that is perceived first, by about 80 ms (Moutoussis & Zeki 1997a,b) , prompting the supposition that the accelerated arrival of motion signals in the cortex is an evolutionary compensation for the slower processing time for motion compared with color. Further studies have shown that different attributes, such as color, orientation, motion, depth, faces, facial expressions, natural scenes, and so on, are perceived at different times ; S Zeki, A Bartels, M Self, L Dell'Acqua-Bellavitis, unpublished results). It is interesting that we are not aware of this perceptual asynchrony, which is only revealed by relatively sophisticated psychophysical experiments. By contrast, some pairs of attributes are perceived at the same time. Depth, for example, is perceived at the same time as orientation, and upward-downward motion at the same time as left-right motion ( Figure 6 ). The theory of perceptual sites supposes that attributes perceived at the same time are processed at the same place whereas those perceived at different times are processed at different places. Though all that we have so far observed is consistent with this theory, it may yet turn out to be wrong or only partially correct. The temporal hierarchy in perception thus obeys neither the anatomical nor the physiological picture; instead, it cuts across both, raising the suspicion that it depends not so much on speed of input as on (micro)processing time in the cortex, and giving us hints about how the visual brain operates. If the activity in different visual areas becomes perceptually explicit at different times, leading to a temporal hierarchy in visual perception, and if perceiving something is being conscious of it, then it follows that we become conscious of different attributes at different times. This in turn implies that consciousness is distributed in time. And because the temporally distributed activity occurs in different areas, consciousness is distributed in space as well.
That a temporal asynchrony can be demonstrated at all implies two things: that over very brief time windows, the activity in different brain nodes is autonomous, and that therefore the brain is able to bind not what happens in real time but only the end points of its own processing systems. Thus the brain "mis-binds" in terms of real time, for example ascribing the "wrong" direction of motion to the "right" color (Moutoussis & Zeki 1997a) . The brain, in other words, does not wait for all the processing systems to terminate their tasks-it has no standard, or zero, time. Over very brief periods of time the brain has not found it necessary to adopt a standard, presumably because no integration occurs, given the autonomy of the separate knowledge-acquiring systems. This raises the question of how integration occurs over a longer time course.
REVERSE HIERARCHIES AND CHRONOARCHITECTONIC MAPS IN THE VISUAL BRAIN
If temporally distributed, do these microconsciousnesses reflect the overall hierarchical organization of the visual brain and that of its subsystems? The traditional view that the brain is hierarchical in connections and function has much merit. For over half a century anatomists have been rightly impressed by the successive nature of the relays, from say V1 to V2 to V4 to the inferior temporal cortex. Many electroencephalographic studies have interpreted V1 to be the first visual area to be activated (Barrett et al 1976 , Halliday 1993 . The demonstration of parallelism within the visual brain does little, in itself, to compromise this view because each one of the parallel systems is itself hierarchical in nature. Physiologically, the cells of V1 are, broadly, functionally less complex than those of, say, V4 or V5, rendering V1 into what has been commonly regarded as a "preprocessing" stage, whatever that may mean. The major input to the prestriate areas comes from area V1 through the retino-geniculo-cortical pathway. Anatomical studies have schematized the connections of cortical areas into a broad hierarchy, not always very satisfactory but consistent enough to be compelling (Felleman & van Essen 1991) . But this impressive evidence in favor of hierarchies has important exceptions, which may give hints about how the brain operates.
The most compelling evidence in favor of a reverse hierarchy comes from studies of area V5. Several lines of evidence show that signals from fast-moving objects reach V5 before they reach V1 (Beckers & Zeki 1995 , ffytche et al 1995 , Zeki & ffytche 1998 . A reverse hierarchy therefore operates in this instance, with important consequences for understanding the functioning of the visual brain. V5 can, in fact, be active without activity in V1. The activity in V5 in such instances is potent enough to result in a conscious experience of fast motion, though not of much else (see above). It is therefore obvious that, in this instance at least, signals from fast-moving objects do not have to be "preprocessed" in V1 and that if in the normal brain any "preprocessing" is executed on fast-moving signals, V5 is the more likely site for it, thus reversing the traditional hierarchy.
This could of course be an exception, but it could equally well be an exception that shows the difficulty of applying the principle of hierarchy derived from anatomical studies to the following:
1. the latency with which signals arrive in the cortex: V5 is not unique in receiving a visual input that bypasses V1. Other areas, including V4, are in the same league; much of the prestriate cortex receives a direct input from the pulvinar (Cragg 1969 , Standage & Benevento 1983 , and the pulvinar itself has been shown to contain a variety of physiological categories of cells, including ones that are apparently selective for colors (Bender 1981) . It remains for the future to determine whether certain categories of signals reach these prestriate areas before they reach V1, just as fast-motion signals reach V5 before V1.
2. processing and perceptual times: Psychophysical evidence suggests that processing time is longer for motion than for color, and that color is perceived before motion, even though motion signals arrive in the cortex first (Moutoussis & Zeki 1997a , Zeki & Moutoussis 1997 ).
The task is to learn what role such reverse hierarchies have and to exploit them to study the functioning of the visual brain. Reverse hierarchies are, in a sense, the product of a system in which different nodes have fair autonomy, and in which there is no terminal stage at which perception is enshrined. The presence of reverse hierarchies, if it is indeed based even partially on autonomy of processing, also necessitates feedback and transverse connections because the processes rendered explicit at one stage of hierarchy must then be communicated to the processes rendered explicit at earlier hierarchical stages of the same, and other, systems. In such a system of internode communication, the concept of a reverse hierarchy may itself be an oversimplification. There may indeed be many crisscrossing hierarchies (Zeki 1998) .
If the knowledge-acquiring system of the visual brain and the attendant microconsciousnesses are distributed in time and space, then the sequence with which different nodes reach a perceptual end point can perhaps in the future be represented by what I call chronoarchitectonic maps of the cerebral cortex (Figure 7 ). To date, the major emphasis of cerebral studies has been to associate distinct functions with histologically or anatomically distinct parts of the cerebral cortex, an emphasis that has reached new heights with the development of brain imaging techniques. Whatever their shortcomings, the common jibe that these are expressions of a "modern phrenology" does little justice to the great advances in schematization that these maps have helped bring about, and the continued use of the Brodmann maps in the interpretation of human imaging studies even today attests to their value. Yet the chronology of activation sketched out above, though for only a small part of the brain, makes one wonder whether the time is not now ripe for locating activity in time and thus developing a new map of the cortex, the chronoarchitectonic map.
Such a map would reveal the time course of activity for each area or coactive groups of areas, thus reconstituting in time the relationship of activity between different cortical areas. The spatial map so produced would be different at any given time and with different visual stimuli. Ideally, the data used to create such a map should have a spatial resolution high enough to differentiate between cortical layers and a temporal resolution that would allow it to reveal, for example, the activity at different cortical processing stages. Though crude, a first approximation to this is the fMRI data, which have a typical spatial resolution of 3 mm 3 and about 4000 ms in time. The algorithm necessary is in fact available even now, in the form of the independent component analysis (ICA) method of Bell & Sejnowski (1995) . To date, the full potential of the ICA method has not been exploited, partly because the most widely used method of spatial localization, that of fMRI, has, at 4000 ms, a very poor temporal resolution in terms of cerebral chronology. Even in spite of these limitations, the ICA method has shown that when humans view a colored Mondrian display in which the wavelength composition of the light coming from every point changes continually, only two areas in the ventral occipital lobe are simultaneously active, V4 and V4α, which together constitute the human V4 complex (Bartels & Zeki 2000) . This gives hope that the method will isolate areas that are simultaneously active at any one time and distinguishes them from areas that are simultaneously active at a subsequent or antecedent time.
Chronoarchitectonic maps would be predicted, from the known facts, to present a very different picture from the current maps, and Figure 7 shows one very early, and therefore crude, such map. In fact, chronoarchitectonic maps would be expected to vary with the stimuli to which a viewer is exposed and with the motor action that may be involved. They would therefore be context dependent. With fast-moving stimuli, the chronology would be V5, then V1 and V2, then V5 again, followed by other visual areas in the parietal and inferior temporal regions. If the stimulus contains both color and motion, an even more complex and unconventional map would be predicted to result. In fact, there may be a number of different chronoarchitectonic maps. One could imagine, for example, a chronoarchitectonic map that displays the chronology of arrival of signals in the brain. Within the visual cortex, V5 would of course take precedence over both V1 and V4. A chronoarchitectonic map depicting conscious experience might well have a different configuration because we now presume that V4 will take precedence over V5. It is possible to envisage a situation, in the remote future, when a chronoarchitectonic map depicting the hierarchy of consciousnesses will become available. Such a chronoarchitectonic map would be different from the one that maps temporally the binding of attributes, as discussed below.
BINDING AND INTEGRATION
Given that in our daily life all the different attributes of vision are seen in temporal and spatial registration, it seems natural to suppose that the activity in the different processing systems, and in the nodes within them, is integrated or bound. What is generally implied by the term binding is the bringing together of what is processed by different systems or, more commonly, the binding of the responses of cells within a single processing system. In the latter instance, binding is thought to distinguish the firing of the "bound" cells from that of all others, thus constituting the neural basis for the kind of perceptual salience that is evident in, for example, figure-ground segregation (Engel et al 1999) . There have been previous classifications of binding (Crick & Koch 1990 . Here, I restrict myself to a discussion of parallel binding between nodes or areas. This refers to the coupling of the activity of cells-e.g. through synchronous or oscillatory firing or any other form of communication-within a single area or across different areas. It is postconscious because it is the microconsciousness generated at a given node of one processing system that is bound to the microconsciousness generated at a given node of another (or the same) processing system.
A Theory of Multistage Integration
In the absence of an exclusive hierarchy and a terminal perceptual station, it becomes natural to suppose that the perceptually explicit activity at each node of one subsystem should potentially be capable of being integrated with activity at each node of another subsystem, in other words that the binding is that of microconsciousnesses generated at the different nodes. In the mesh of connections linking the different nodes, the forward ones obey the like-with-like principle, whereas the reverse and transverse ones do not. Thus, transverse connections can be of the like-with-like variety, e.g. between the blobs of V1 (Livingstone & Hubel 1984) , or of the like-with-unlike variety, e.g. the connections between blobs and nonblobs (Yoshioka et al 1996 , Hubener & Bolz 1992 or the lateral connections that link the thick and thin stripes of V2 (Rockland & Lund 1983 , Rockland 1985 , Lund et al 1993 , Levitt et al 1994 . Reverse connections are often of the like-with-unlike variety , Rockland & van Hoesen 1994 . For example, unlike the forward connections from V1 to V5, the reverse connections from V5 to V1 or V2 are not restricted to the territory of the thick stripes in V2 or the territory of layer 4B cells of V1, which project to V5. Because the like-with-like pathway is hierarchical whereas the other two are not, it follows that integration itself can be hierarchical or not, or it may even form a hierarchy of its own. This constitutes the basis of the theory of multistage integration (Zeki 1990b , Bartels & Zeki 1998 .
Assuming that activity at each node has a perceptual correlate, multistage integration leads to an increased number of different possible combinations and thus of perceptual repertoires, by bringing about integration between different perceptual correlates. The repertoires would be reduced if the processing systems had to report to a "terminal" station-either a common one or individual onesfor integration to occur. Such a hypothetical integrator area would have to code the results of processing at each node in a perceptually explicit way, separately and in the required combinations. The number of pairwise connections between N nodes = N × (N − 1)/2. Even given the constraints of cortical connectivity, this would still create a vast repertoire that would not be possible if integration could only occur between hypothetical "terminal" stages. Moreover, if the result of activity at a given stage is not made perceptually explicit, it would be lost in subsequent perceptual stages and would therefore no longer be perceptually accessible. Multistage integration makes the activity at different nodes accessible to each other.
Third Area Involvement in Parallel Binding of the Activity in Two or More Nodes
What decides that activity at a particular node should be bound to activity at another? One inevitably thinks of the strength of activity at different nodes and their timing. What actual strength is required is unclear, but if parallel binding is indeed postconscious, then one would postulate a strength that is sufficient to have a conscious correlate. Timing creates a problem, if different nodes reach a perceptual end point at different times. One is therefore led to ask whether there is any third area, besides the general "enabling" system in the reticular formation (see below), that is systematically involved in supervising, overseeing, or simply determining that binding and integration occurs, by perhaps synchronizing the activity of the different nodes in space and time.
In theory, there is no mandatory need for third-area involvement in binding two simple attributes, such as may be found in, say, moving green dots, when the wavelength composition of the dots is continually changing. One could postulate a direct anatomical connection between the centers involved, V4 and V5, for which there is evidence (though in our experience these connections are not strong). Given that color is perceived before motion, one would also need to postulate some timing adjustment or monitoring. But the situation may be more complex when, say, a form is generated from color and motion. Form vision correlates with activity in the fusiform gyrus (Bly & Kosslyn 1997) , distinct from both V4 and V5. Hence, any stimulus that has a form generated from form and motion should, in theory, activate areas V4 and V5 and the fusiform gyrus. Evidence from a study in which subjects were asked to view shapes that can only be recognized by binding motion from one part of the shape with color from another part (Perry & Zeki 2000) suggests that a third area, located in the superior parietal lobule, is also specifically engaged in the binding, even when allowance has been made for the spatial distribution of the stimulus that emerges from color and motion. We note that object recognition does not correlate with activity in the parietal cortex (Bly & Kosslyn 1997) whereas lesions in it lead to problems of binding (Treisman 1996) .
"Transient" Cortical Areas
The involvement of third areas in parallel binding has important implications for future studies of binding. It is possible that only when the consequence of parallel binding is the emergence of a new category, not encoded in the two (or more) areas involved, that the binding is monitored and determined by a third area. It is still not clear whether the superior parietal lobule is specifically involved in the binding of color and motion, or whether it is involved in all types of binding; nor is it known whether other kinds of binding involve other cortical areas, distinct from the superior parietal cortex, either in the parietal lobe or elsewhere. But the involvement of third areas in binding, even though presently demonstrated only for the superior parietal lobule and for binding between color and motion, raises the interesting possibility of what I shall call dynamic or "transient" areas. When subjects are stimulated with motion alone or color alone, the parietal lobe is either weakly activated or not activated at all; when they view objects, the activation is restricted to the fusiform gyrus and does not involve the parietal cortex. However when they view objects constructed from motion and color, the parietal cortex suddenly becomes active (Perry & Zeki 2000) , as if it has established a temporary functional connection with the fusiform gyrus and with areas V4 and V5. I refer to this as a transient area because I envisage it to be a dynamic entity, cutting across areas. Transient areas would be established by anatomical connections that, though permanently present, are not continuously active. Anatomical studies show that there are strong connections between the parietal and inferior temporal areas (Morel & Bullier 1990 ) and weak ones between V4 and V5 (Shipp & Zeki 1995) . The areas are thus envisaged to be temporary only in terms of time; the very same "area" should become active whenever the same, or a similar, stimulus is viewed. A "thought process," leading to abstraction, might involve such temporary areas, at least in its initial stages. If there are indeed such temporary areas, one would expect an even more complex chronoarchitectonic map with stimuli that bring these areas momentarily into play. Note, again, that we are not conscious of the activity within such putative temporary areas but only of the final result, which in the example given above is the activity within the fusiform gyrus alone.
GLOBALIZATION OF CONSCIOUS VISION
So far, I have adopted what many would regard as an extreme position: fractionating consciousness and the unconscious processes underlying it, and supposing that there are many distributed mechanisms for creating ideals and for abstraction. This view may turn out to be partially or completely wrong. Currently, I find it disturbingly seductive: disturbing because this is not how I imagined the brain functions, and seductive because the evidence that has impressed me most points in that direction. Taken to further extremes, it would imply that activity in an area like V5, disconnected from the rest of the cerebral cortex but able to receive signals from a healthy retina, should have a conscious correlate. This is unlikely to be true, and it raises the question of what the minimum cortical machinery might be to allow an area like V5 to function in the way that it does. There is no ready answer to that question today but there are certain guides. Among these are the following:
1. the presence of an enabling system. Although patient GY is usually able to discriminate fast-moving stimuli and is unaware that he cannot discriminate slow-moving stimuli, in our experiments he was not aware during every fast-motion trial nor was he unaware during every slow-motion one (Zeki & ffytche 1998) . We designed our experiments in such a way that we could compare the activity produced in his brain when "aware" trials were compared with "unaware" trials. The comparison showed that the only significant activity in his brain was located inferior to the ponto-medullary junction, which we interpret to be the reticular formation (Figure 8 ). This suggests that there must be an "enabling" system located in the reticular formation (Zeki & ffytche 1998) , a zone long ago implicated in consciousness (Moruzzi & Magoun 1949) , and that V5 is not acting in isolation. 2. a minimum strength of activity. Although GY is, in general, not aware of and cannot discriminate slowly moving (<2 • s −1 ) stimuli whereas he is both aware of and can discriminate fast-moving (>10
• s −1 ) stimuli, GY's brain activity when he views slowly moving stimuli compared with when he views a blank screen shows that there is activity within V5 (Zeki & ffytche 1998) (Figure 9 ). That he is not aware of these stimuli while being aware of fast-moving stimuli, which produce a more pronounced activity in V5, makes it plausible to suppose that a conscious correlate depends on a minimum strength of activity at a node. This of course raises the critical question of whether there are any particular cells within, say, V5 whose activity is critical for generating consciousness, although the question itself makes a questionable presumption that the activity of one set of cells can be separated, in this context, from the activity of another. We have no ready answer to this question, but the studies of Logothetis (1998) have shown that there are many cells in each cortical area whose activity correlates with perception, though their distribution according to layers remains uncharted. The proportion of such cells increases as one proceeds from what are traditionally regarded as lower areas to higher ones. Conversely, there are also many cells in each area whose activity does not correlate with perception, which is not to say that they are not intimately involved, in that their activity is crucial to the emergence of cells whose activity does correlate with perception. can apparently still experience biological motion (Vaina et al 1990) . This implies that the healthy functioning of the whole of the motion complex is dispensable, at least for the conscious experience of biological motion. 4. reciprocal activation-deactivation. The intimate link between V5 and other areas, not obviously concerned with motion, comes from imaging evidence that shows that activation of area V4 with color stimuli is accompanied by the inactivation of area V5 (Zeki 1997) (Figure 10) , and possibly other areas as well, whereas activation of parts of the limbic system with faces of loved persons is accompanied by widespread deactivation of other parts of the limbic system (Bartels & Zeki 2000) . Such reciprocal activation-deactivation processes suggest that many areas may be involved in an unspecified way in the generation of a perceptually explicit, conscious, correlate to activity within an area, but what their precise role may be is anyone's guess. In emphasizing the importance of involvement of large parts of the cortex in generating consciousness, the notions of dynamic cores (Tononi et al 1994) and of complexity (Tononi & Edelman 1998 ) have much to recommend them and deserve careful pursuit. They may constitute further organizing principles in the Kantian sense, applicable to the generation of consciousness at large. But as currently formulated they do not address the question of what, in terms of cortical areas and processes involved, would constitute a dynamic core for generating a conscious correlate of activity at a single node, for example of fast motion through the activity of a V5 that is disconnected from V1.
CONCLUSION
In trying to account for conscious vision, we thus have two competing sets of facts that have somehow to be reconciled. On the one hand are the facts of anatomy, physiology, pathology, and psychophysics which tell that activity in the specialized processing systems and the nodes within them can have a conscious correlate, even in a vastly impoverished cortex. On the other, we have the knowledge that a greatly enhanced and sophisticated repertoire is the preserve of a hugely expanded and complexly interconnected cerebral cortex. On the one hand, we have to account for the microorganizing principles that underlie the activity at individual nodes and result in a conscious correlate, and on the other we have to try to understand whether there is an overall general organizing principle that not only controls the microorganizing principles but also enhances their capacity. If biology is anything to go by, the solution, when found, will probably turn out to be dazzlingly simple and elegant. But so far it has been elusive and beyond the reach of all.
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Figure 3
The human color center (the V4 complex) is located in the fusiform gyrus and consists of two subdivisions. (a) Here it is activated when subjects view a multicolored display that is illuminated by a light source whose wavelength composition changes continually-the subjects however perceive constant colors. (b) Retinotopic stimulation shows that area V4 is retinotopically organized whereas V4α is not. (c) An independent component analysis separates independent maps of brain activity without a priori knowledge about the stimulus conditions. The isolation of the complete V4 complex from all other brain activity (shown here in the glass-brain view of a single subject's brain) indicates that V4 and V4α act independently of other areas as a functional unit. Because it is damage to this very area that leads to the syndrome of cerebral achromatopsia, when subjects are no longer able to see the world in color but only in shades of grey, we are led to equate the processing system with the perceptual system. [From Bartels & Zeki (2000) .] Figure 6 A schematization of the theory of perceptual sites, which supposes that attributes processed in the same node are perceived simultaneously, whereas attributes processed in different nodes are perceived asynchronously. The diagrams indicate the latencies with which one attribute is perceived with respect to another, each averaged for seven or more subjects. If two attributes (e.g. left-right motion and up-down motion) are perceived at the same time, the vector will show no displacement from 0 ms. Any displacement of the vector will indicate that one of two attributes is perceived before the other. In the examples given above, color (a) and depth (b) are perceived before motion whereas depth and orientation (c) as well as left-right motion and up-down motion (d ) are perceived simultaneously. The relative perceptual times for different attributes are summarized in (e). [Modified from .] applied to the 320 whole-brain images obtained when a single subject watched 20 min of the opening sequence of the James Bond movie Tomorrow Never Dies. ICA isolated functionally specialized areas in separate components together with the time courses of their activations. It did so without a priori knowledge, utilizing the fact that each functionally specialized area has a unique spatial extent and a time course that differs from all the others. From the many areas isolated we show here only six (shown from top down) 1. the middle parietal cortex along with a part of the posterior cingulate cortex; 2. the visual motion area V5 (middle temporal); 3. the left visual color area V4; 4. the visual face/object recognition area; 5. Broca's speech generation area (presumed); 6. left primary visual cortex (V1). The color code next to the time courses is used in Figure 7 (right) to demonstrate the relative activity that each of the six maps has at different points in time (indicated by vertical lines I-III across the time courses), thus revealing the chronoarchitecture of the human brain when so stimulated (from . (Right) The chronoarchitecture of the human brain revealed by application of ICA to fMRI data. The independent components shown in Figure 7 (left) were thresholded and superimposed onto a single glass-brain view after being color-coded according to their relative activity at a given time. This procedure was applied three times to the same six independent components from the previous figure . The three maps reveal how the pattern of activity of the functionally specialized areas changes across time, with different areas changing their activity in individual ways across time. We refer to these types of maps as to chronoarchitectonic maps, in this case of a single human brain watching a James Bond movie. For example the activity of the visual motion area V5, isolated in component number 2 in Figure 7 (left), is medium active (green) at time (I), low at time (II), and medium high at time (III), whereas Broca's area is low at (I), high at (II), and medium at (III). [From Bartels & Zeki 1999) .]
